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MILLER V. DeWITT: ARCHITECT'S LIABILITY FOR
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE CONTRACTOR'S
METHODS
In Miller v. DeWitt 1 the Supreme Court of Illinois clearly expanded the liability of a supervising architect when it held that
architects, who only had general supervision and direction of a
project and authority to stop the work to insure its proper execution, were nevertheless negligent in their failure to inspect and
oversee shoring which was expressly within the control and responsibility of the general contractor.
This Note will analyze the common-law liability of an architect
to a contractor's employee, not because of negligently made plans
and specifications or failure to supervise the results of the contractor's work, but for the architects' failure to supervise the
"methods" or techniques of construction utilized by the contractor.2 Suggestions will be offered concerning the advisability of
imposing such a duty on an architect in view of legal precedent,
public policy, and the practical realities of construction site responsibilities.
FACTS
The Miller decision arose out of an action brought by three
employees of a contractor who were injured when the roof on
which they were working collapsed. The employer of the plaintiffs was under a contract to remodel and enlarge a school gymnasium. The defendant architects were under a contract for making the necessary plans and specifications and for general supervision of the work.
At one point it became necessary to remove the existing supports of a portion of the gymnasium roof. After studying the plans
and making his own observations, the contractor's superintendent
undertook the task of shoring up the roof in anticipation of the
removal of the existing supports. Upon completion of the shoring
a work crew, which included the plaintiffs, was brought in to remove the permanent roof supports. The injuries for which the suit
was brought occurred when the columns were disconnected and
the shoring proved inadequate, resulting in the collapse of the
roof. The plaintiffs alleged common-law negligence by the architects and a violation of the Illinois Structural Work Act 3 by both
1. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d
2. The scope of this Note
liability and does not consider
"scaffold acts."
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§

630 (1967).
includes only the architect's common-law
specialized liability under various state
60, 69 (1963).

Spring 1968]

NOTES

the architects and the owner. The architects filed a third-party
complaint against the contractor which was disposed of by a motion to dismiss before any evidence was heard. The jury returned
a verdict against the architects under both courts and found in
favor of the owners. All the actions of the trial court were
affirmed by the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.4 On
certiorari to the supreme court it was held inter alia5 that the
architects, who had a right of general supervision and authority to
stop the work if not done pursuant to the specifications, were liable for their failure to inspect and supervise the shoring "method"
for the protection of the workers.6
The grounds of the court's decision were: (a) that the architects failed to oversee and inspect the shoring to determine whether
it was safe; and (b) that the architects negligently and carelessly
failed to exercise the degree of skill ordinarily exercised by competent architects in the community. The court rejected the architects contention that a supervising architect has neither the right
nor the duty to control the "methods" of construction, but is only
responsible for seeing that the completed structure meets the requirements of the owner which are generally embodied in the architect's specifications.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The liability of architects, as well as others engaged in the
construction industry, to third parties not in privity of contract
has been slow to follow the expanding liability of manufacturers
and suppliers of chattels. At one time the courts drew a distinc-

tion between the liability of a manufacturer of a chattel and that
of a builder of a structure or real property. This distinction
was later set aside; for example, in Foley v. Pittsburgh-DesMoines
4. Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965). The
supreme court adopted the appellate opinion's reasoning regarding the
architects' common-law liability. For purposes of analysis both decisions
are taken together.
5. The dismissal of the architects' third-party complaint was reversed and remanded for trial. The court held that Illinois workmen's
compensation laws do not prohibit indemnification from an employer
where such employer is directly responsible for his employee's injuries.
The court recognized the probability that upon trial the contractor would
be found to have been actively negligent and the architect only passively
negligent. For discussion of this aspect of the decision see p. 518 infra.
6. The court did not take into consideration the other two allegations
that the defendant architects:
(a) Negligently and carelessly failed to provide for adequate
support for the roof of said gymnasium prior to having the structural supports therefor removed;
(b) Negligently and carelessly failed to calculate a sufficient
safety factor to be used in the scaffolding under said roof....
37 Ill. 2d at 285, 226 N.E.2d at 638.
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Co. 7 it was said: "There is no logical basis for such a distinction,
and it would obviously be absurd to hold that a manufacturer would
be liable in building a small, readily movable tank which would
undoubtedly be a chattel, but not in building an enormously large
. ..one that legally was classified as realty."" With the elimination of this distinction, it became possible to apply the reasoning
which developed out of MacPhersonv. Buick Motor CoP A manufacturer, and by analogy an architect or contractor, who knows
that his product will be used by or otherwise come into contact with
third parties must exercise due care for their protection. The rule
is now well established that an architect may be held liable to
third parties where he has failed to exercise the ordinary standard
of care recognized by his profession either in designing a structure10 or in seeing that the structure is properly constructed
according to specifications.1 ' The question which continues to be
at issue is the extent to which an architect should be required not
only to protect third parties from a structure which does not meet
proper specifications, but also to protect them from the actual
"methods" of construction which are in the domain of the contractor.
CONTRACT RELATIONSHIPS

The contracts in the Miller case are relevant in two respects:
(1) they are an express statement of the respective responsibilities
of the architect and the contractor; and (2) they constitute a
significant part of the facts from which the court found a common
law duty to the injured plaintiffs. In Miller, as in any construction site injury situation, there are three parties to whom the
plaintiff may look for recovery: the owner, the contractor, 12 and
the architect. Although the duty to a third party is neither
determined by, nor limited to, the contractual duties of the respective parties, the contract provisions are evidence of what the parties foresaw as their respective responsibilities. Therefore they
should be taken into consideration along with industry custom in
determining which of the previously mentioned parties is responsible for the injury. The parties are, of course, free to obligate
themselves to any duties they desire. As far as the architect's
7. Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949);

see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 385 (1965). See generally W. PROSSER,
TORTS § 99 (3d ed. 1964).
8. 363 Pa. at 34-35, 68 A.2d at 533.
9. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1150 (1916); see W. PROSSER, note 7 supra
at § 99.
10. See Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143
N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957); see Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1081 (1958).
11. See Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133
(1963). For cases dealing with liability arising out of the failure of the
completed structure see note 26 infra.
12. Recovery against the contractor by his employee is usually limited
by workmen's compensation laws.
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status and duty to supervise is concerned, however, the contract
obligations appear to be standardized. For example, the relevant
provisions of the contracts in Miller18 are similar to those involved
in most of the cases bearing on the issue. They also correspond
with standard provisions
recommended by the American Insti4
tute of Architects.1

A reading of the contracts indicates that the supervisory responsibility imposed by the Miller majority on the architects was
clearly not contemplated by the parties when they formed their
agreements. According to the architects' contract they have: "[T] he
general administration of the construction contracts, and supervision of the work."" This supervision, however, "is to be distinguished from the continuous personal superintendence to be obtained by the employment of a clerk-of-the-works."' 6 These provisions do not indicate that the defendant architects were re13. Architects-Owner:

1. The Architects' Services: [T]he general administration of the
construction contracts, and supervision of the work.
6. Supervision of the Work: The Architect will endeavor to guard
the Owner against defects and deficiencies in the work of the
Contractors, but he does not guarantee the performance of their
contracts. The supervision of an Architect is to be distinguished
from the continuous personal superintendence to be obtained by the
employment of a clerk-of-the-works. (who is employed by the
owner).
Contractor - Owner:

12.

Protectionof Work and Property:
The Contractor shall take all necessary precautions for the

safety of employees on the work ....

[Hie shall designate a

responsible member of his organization on the work, whose duty
shall be the prevention of accidents.
14. Superintendence: Supervision:
The Contractor shall keep on his work, during its progress, a
competent superintendent and any necessary assistants, all. satisfactory to .the Architect.
38. Architect's Status:
The Architect shall have general supervision and direction of
the work. He is the agent of the Owner only to the extent provided in the Contract Documents and when in special instances he
shall, upon request, show the Contractor written authority. He has
the authority to stop the work whenever such -stoppage may be
necessary to insure the proper execution of the contract.
55. Protection:
Bracing, shoring and sheeting: The Contractor shall provide all
bracing, shoring and sheeting as required for safety and for proper
execution of the work, and have same removed when the work is
completed.
37 Ill. 2d at 280-83, 226 N.E.2d at 635-37.
14. For reference to American Institute of Architects standard forms
see L. JONES, LEGAL FORMs ANNOTATED form 17-8, at 379-80 (9th ed. 1946);
L. JONES, LEGAL FoRMs form 21:1, at 398, form 21:5, at 416-17, 425 (10th
ed. 1962) (revised forms).
15. For a detailed citation of the relevant contract provisions see
note 13 supra.
16. Id.
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sponsible for inspecting and overseeing the methods chosen by
the contractor. No "clerk-of-the-works" referred to in the architect's contract was hired by the owner. A reading of the contractor's responsibilities, however, under his contract with the
owner explains why none was needed:
(a) The Contractor shall take all necessary precautions
for the safety of employees on the work ....
(b) The Contractor shall keep on his work, during its
progress, a competent superintendent and any necessary
assistants....
(c) The Contractor shall provide all bracing, shoring
and sheeting as required for safety and for proper execution of the work ....17
By comparing the obligations of the architects and the contractor on the basis of their contracts alone, it appears that the
supervision necessary to protect the plaintiffs in this case was in
the hands of the contractor. In addition, the contract puts worker
protection generally, and shoring specifically, upon the contractor's
shoulders. It would therefore appear, as the dissent says, "Since
there is no contractual obligation, liability is fixed by an expansion
of the common law."' 18 Conceding that the basis of the architects' liability in this case is ex delicto, it is submitted that the
contracts are still of prime importance as facts from which legal
responsibility should or should not evolve. First, the contracts do
not evidence an attempt to create total immunity from suits by
injured third parties. On the contrary, the contract provisions specifically put the burden of close and continuous supervision on the
contractor and not the architect. In addition, the direct cause of
the plaintiffs' injuries in Miller appears to be the failure of the
contractor to competently carry out a shoring operation which is
expressly within his control and responsibility. Consequently,
the court is imposing a duty of foresight on the architects which
the contracts clearly placed in the contractor's domain. Secondly, the contracts indicate the customary division of responsibilities in the construction industry. The fact that they are so greatly
standardized is adequate evidence of this. Before the courts
overturn such a well established division of responsibility, which
result the Miller decision has at the very least initiated, there
should be a more thorough examination of both the legal and economic consequences than was undertaken by the court in Miller.
ANALYSIS OF PERTINENT CASES

It is clear that legal duties may be imposed in addition to or
independent of any contractual duties. 19 The following principles
17. Id.
18. 37 Ill. 2d at 294, 226 N.E.2d at 643 (dissenting opinion).
19. See Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285, 289, 56 S.E.2d 684, 688
(1949); Yanetti v. Kessler, Inc., 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 491, 495 (C.P. Schuylkill
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are suggested as the criteria upon which the imposition of such
legal duties should turn and as a guideline for an analysis of case
law dealing with an architect's supervisory duties to third parties:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a
matter of policy and involves the balancing of various
factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability
of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, and the policy
20
of preventing future harm.

The quantity of case law concerning the architect's liability
for negligent supervision is not large. These cases have held architects liable for their negligence to third parties. Although
these cases are not cited by the Miller decision, they were cited
in the intermediate appellate court opinion. One such case was
Montijo v. Swift

21

which sets forth the following general duty of

an architect:
[A] n architect who plans and supervises construction work
as an independent contractor, is under a duty to exercise
ordinary care in the course thereof for the protection of any
person who foreseeably and with reasonable certainty may
be injured by his failure to do S0.22
Notwithstanding the propriety of this statement concerning the
general duty of an architect, the rule does not apply to the Miller
setting. The injury in Montijo resulted from a fault in the finished
structure rather than a faulty construction method. Moreover,
the liability of the architect in Montijo stemmed from an error
in design, not supervision.
Both the supreme court in Miller and, to a great extent, the
appellate court heavily emphasized the proposition that the architect's general supervision over the work, including his authority
to stop construction, should give rise to a "commensurate responsibility. 23 Support for this premise is cited in United States ex
rel Los Angeles Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers,24 which
involved a counterclaim by a contractor against an architect who
1954); accord, Glanzer v. Shepard, 194 App. Div. 693, 186 N.Y.S. 88 (1921),
aff'd, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
20. United States ex rel. Los Angeles Testing Laboratory v. Rogers &
Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D. Cal. 1958), quoting Biakanja v. Irving,
49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958); cf. 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs
§ 18.6, at 1049-53 (1956).
21. 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963).
22. Id. at 353, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
23. 59 Ill. App. 2d at 93, 208 N.E.2d at 275.
24. 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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negligently allowed improper materials to be used in construction.
The architect had to stop the construction project in order that the
necessary modifications could be made. This resulted in a substantial increase in costs and loss of time for the contractor. The
court upheld the counterclaim upon the premise that the architect's control is such that he should be under a duty to supervise
with due care for the benefit and protection of the contractor notwithstanding his sole contractual obligation to the owner.
Altogether too much control over the contractor necessarily rests in the hands of the supervising architect for him
not to be placed under a duty imposed by law to perform
without negligence his functions as they affect the contractor. The power of the architect to stop the work alone
is tantamount to a power of economic life or death over
the contractor. It is only just that such authority, exercised in such
25 a relationship, carry commensurate legal responsibility.
Certainly there can be no argument with this decision when the
negligence of the architect coupled with his authority over the contractor results in injury to the latter. The Miller application of
this reasoning is not warranted, however, where the injury is to
other third parties, for example, the contractor's employees. If
liability is to be imposed, it must arise out of a duty to the
employees themselves.
The reasoning of the three cases relied on by the appellate
court in Miller which stand for the general principle that an architect may be held liable for his failure to exercise proper care when
supervising construction, 2 , appear also to be misapplied. An important distinction is that they all involve liability to the owner
based on the failure of the finished structure to meet the expectations of the agreement.
Erhart v. Hummends, relied on by the supreme court in Miller, is clearly the most persuasive authority cited.27 Architects
were held liable for the deaths of construction workers which resulted when the walls of an excavation caved-in due to improper
shoring. Reliance on this case is enhanced by the similarity of the
contract provisions relating to the architects' supervisory status and
authority to stop work in order to insure proper execution of the
25. Id. at 135-36.
26. Lotholz v. Fiedler, 59 Ill. App. 379 (1895) (In a suit by architect

against owner for fees, the owner successfully defended on the grounds
that the completed structure was not in accord with contract specifications
due to architect's negligent supervision); Scott v. Potomac Ins. Co., 217 Ore.

323, 341 P.2d 1083 (1959) (Suit by architects against their insurer to
recover amounts paid to settle malpractice claim when heating system
failed to work properly); Willner v. Woodward, 201 Va. 104, 109 S.E.2d 132
(1959) (Suit by owner against architects for negligent supervision resulting
in failure of heating and air conditioning system).
27. 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960).
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contract. 28 It is also significant that the shoring here, as in
Miller, is the responsibility of the contractor. 29 On its face Erhart
purports to find a duty to protect the construction workers from
hazardous methods employed by the contractor in the same factual
setting that existed in Miller. A closer examination, however, reveals two factors not apparent in Miller which might have had a
telling influence on the result in Erhart.
The first factor is additional language in the contract between
the owner and the contractor, specifically set forth in Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. J. A. Jones Construction Co.,30 where the architect's insurer in Erhart sued the contractor for indemnification.
The contract states:

"RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTOR-The

General

Contractor shall take over and assume all responsibility for the
entire premises. He shall erect such protection as may be required
by the Architect. ... "31 This provision, although not in the architect's contract, certainly gives an indication of the expectations of
the parties as to their respective responsibilities and thus facilitates
the imposition on the architect of a legal duty to the injured workers. A second factor in Erhart but not apparent in Miller is the
insertion of section 204 of the Little Rock Building Code which
provides:
Special Engineering Supervision: Any owner or his agent
engaged in the erection or causing the erection of a building
or structure . . . shall employ a registered architect or a

licensed engineer to supervise the construction
building .

. .

of the

. [A]nd his service shall extend over all im-

portant details of framing, erection and assembly and he
shall render full inspection
service and adequate supervi32
sion on such buildings.
These factors, which were not present in Miller, gave the Erhart
court a more solid foundation on which to impose on the architect
a duty to foresee injury to workers resulting from the "methods"
of construction, and hence a duty to supervise such "methods.133
28. In both Erhart and Miller the contract between the contractor and

the owner contained the following clause: "The architect shall have gen-

eral supervision and direction of the work. He has the authority to stop
the work whenever such stoppage may be necessary to insure the proper
execution of the contract." Erhart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 138, 374
S.W.2d 869, 872 (1960); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 282, 226 N.E.2d 630,

637 (1967).

29. For the relevant contract provisions see 232 Ark. 138, 374 S.W.2d
at 872; Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 283, 226 N.E.2d 630, 637 (1967). The
important provisions are compiled in note 13 supra.
30. 200 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Ark. 1961), aff'd, 325 F.2d 605 (8th Cir.
1963).

31. 200 F. Supp. at 268 (emphasis added).
32. 325 F.2d at 608, quoting LITTLE ROCK, ARK., BUILDING CODE § 204

(1961).
33. In support of its decision, the appellate court in Miller made reference to an English case, Clay v. A. J. Crump & Sons, Ltd., [1963] 3 All
E.R. 687 (C.A.), where an architect was held liable to an injured worker for
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The dissenting opinions in both Miller and Erhart had difficulty
in finding a rationale for burdening the supervising architect4 with
duties which clearly were to be undertaken by the contractor.
Garden City Floral Co. v. Hunt 35 lends support to the archi-

tects' position that neither standard contract provisions concerning
supervision, custom in the industry, or any other policy compels
supervision of the contractor's methods. This case involved a suit
by the owner against his contractor alleging that the contractor's
negligent excavating caused the collapse of the owner's building
situated on an adjacent lot. In defense, the contractor's surety
argued that the owner contributed to his own harm by failing to
provide an architect who would have "full" supervision of the work
pursuant to the contract.3 6 In rejecting this defense, the court
reasoned that the architect was charged only with general supervision over the work to see that it conformed to the specifications.
The court pointed out that the obligation of "full supervision" refers to the results of the contractor's work and that to make the
architect responsible for the "methods" used by the contractor
would remove the architect from his customary and proper role.
The court further states: ".

.

. as a matter of law the courts recog-

nize that an architect merely supervises the results and does not
dictate the methods when not controlled by the specifications. 37
Clearly this case does not deal with an architect's duty to a construction worker. It does, however, provide insight into the relationship between the architect and the contractor and the duties
which are customarily thought to arise from the relationship.
A number of cases have repudiated any duty on an architect to
protect construction workers or other third parties from injuries
due to negligent methods employed by the contractor. This is because of a recognition that there is a distinction between a supervision of methods and supervision looking to the final results.
Clinton v. Boehn38 is a leading case supporting the architects' posinegligent supervision. In this case the architect was specifically requested
to give his professional opinion on the safety of a procedure. The architect
gave his opinion without exercising care to determine the validity of it.
Consequently, the court did not decide the question of an architect's duty to
supervise methods on his own initiative which is the issue in Miller.
Rather, the court applied the rule that regardless of the lack of a duty to
act in the first place, once the duty was undertaken, the actor had the
obligation to exercise due care.
34. Erhart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 141-42, 334 S.W.2d 869, 874-75
(1960) (dissenting opinion); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 292-95, 226 N.E.
2d 630, 642-43 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
35. 126 Mont. 537, 255 P.2d 352 (1953).
36. Id. at 544, 255 P.2d at 356.
37. Id. at 545, 255 P.2d at 357; accord, Charles Meads & Co. v. City of
New York, 191 App. Div. 365, 181 N.Y.S. 704 (1920); cf. Leverone v. Arancio,
179 Mass. 439, 61 N.E. 45 (1901); Reifsnyder v. Dougherty, 301 Pa. 328,
152 A. 98 (1930).
38. 139 App. Div. 73, 124 N.Y.S. 789 (1910).
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tion and is the primary authority for a substantial line of cases in
New York. The architects sought to recover fees, and the defendant
owner counterclaimed for indemnification for damages paid to the
estate of a construction worker who was killed on the job. The
issue in the counterclaim was whether the architects, in addition
to seeing that the finished building was in accord with the plans
and specifications, must also supervise the methods utilized by the
contractor to. insure compliance with building codes. The protection sought by these codes was solely for the workmen's benefit.
In disposing of the counterclaim the court said:
The very utmost obligation assumed by the plaintiffs under their alleged special contract of supervision was to see
that the building was properly constructed, and, if that result was achieved, they were not called upon to watch and
inspect every means adopted by the contractors in fulfilling their contract.39
In Olsen v. Chase Manhatten Bank 40 the architect was sued
along with the owner for negligence by a contractor's employee
who was injured when a drill fell from a temporary platform built
by the contractor. The architect's contract required, in addition
to making plans and specifications, "complete supervision of the
work 4' . . . [and] such general administration and supervision of
the work as may be required to furnish the owner with a finished
'42
building in conformance with the drawings and specifications.
The appellate division dismissed the complaint against the architects, holding that they were chargeable with nonfeasance for
which they were only liable to the owner. More significantly,
the court of appeals in affirming the decision said:
As to defendants architects and engineers, the evidence
showed that their sole supervisory function was to insure
performance of the construction work in accordance with
the plans and specifications; to see that standards of safety
were met in relation to the permanent construction ... ,
but not the safety of temporary platforms used in connection with the permanent construction work. There being
no duty, we do not reach the question
of liability to a third
43
party by reason of nonfeasance.
Neither the Olsen decision, nor any of those discussed, was based
on contract responsibilities alone since the architects would have
39. Id. at 75, 124 N.Y.S. at 792 (emphasis added).
40. 10 App. Div. 2d 539, 205 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 829,
175 N.E.2d 350, 215 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1961).
41. Id. at 542, 205 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
42. Id.
43. 9 N.Y.2d at 831, 175 N.E.2d at 350, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75 (emphasis added). For cases concerning the liability of supervising engineers see
Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority, 21 App. Div. 2d 819,
251 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 136, 209 N.E.2d 802, 262 N.Y.S.2d
476 (1965); Ramos v. Shumavon, 21 App. Div. 2d 4, 247 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1964),
aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 610, 203 N.E.2d 912, 255 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1964).
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difficulty limiting their legal duty to third parties by contract.
The courts have, within the context of those principles which de44
termine one's liability to third parties not in privity of contract,
held that an architect having general supervision over the results
of construction does not have a duty to supervise the "methods"
by which such results are achieved.
45
One other leading case, Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp.,
supports the distinction urged by the architects in Miller. A subcontractor's employee was killed during the test of a hot water
system when a boiler exploded because no pressure relief valve
was installed. The contract language concerning the architect's
supervision was: "to exercise adequate supervision of the execution of the work to reasonably insure strict conformity with the
working drawings, specifications, and other contract documents. ' 46
The narrow issue decided was whether the architects had a duty:
(1) to be aware of the installation; and (2) to inspect the system
prior to testing. The court, following the line of reasoning developed in the cases previously discussed, found no logic or policy to
impose upon an architect the duty to inspect the "methods" employed by a contractor or subcontractor.
A substantial number of authorities suggest a distinction in the
architect's status which would depend on his activity. As a designer and planner, he would be considered an independent contractor.47 On the other hand, when he supervises construction, he
is considered the agent of the owner.48 This distinction has been
decisive in some negligence actions brought by third parties, the
leading decision being Potter v. Gilbert.49 The architect was sued
in a wrongful death action by the estate of a construction worker
who was killed when part of the building on which he was working
collapsed. The court reasoned that a supervising architect, as the
agent of the owner, is only responsible to his principal on a charge
of nonfeasance and that there can be no direct liability to a third
party. The appellate court in Miller specified that this theory was
not followed in Illinois. In fact, the notion of an agent's nonliability to third parties for nonfeasance has been generally aban44. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
45. 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961).
46. Id. at 293-94, 128 So. 2d at 662.
47. See Looker v. Gulf Coast Fair, 203 Ala. 42, 81 So. 832 (1919);
Burke v. Ireland, 166 N.Y. 305, 59 N.E. 914 (1901); Mackay v. Benjamin
Franklin Realty & Holding Co., 288 Pa. 207, 135 A. 613 (1927). See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R. 1168, § 4, at 1182 (1922).
48. See Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 126
P. 351 (1912); Manton v. H. L. Stevens & Co., 170 Iowa 495, 153 N.W. 87
(1915); Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187, 36 A. 104 (1896); Fuchs v. Parsons
Constr. Co., 172 Neb. 719, 111 N.W.2d 727 (1961). See generally Annot.,
19 A.L.R. 226, § 17, at 259 (1922).
49. 130 App. Div. 632, 115 N.Y.S. 425 (1909), aff'd, 196 N.Y. 576, 90
N.E. 1165 (1909).
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doned, 50 and the New York courts represent the last bastion of this
defense. 51 It should also be noted that the Potter opinion, in
addition to the agency question, also had difficulty in perceiving a
the construction methods of a
duty on the architect to supervise
52
presumably competent contractor.
ANALOGY

Analysis of the foregoing cases indicates that the element of
control stands out as the key factor in determining the architect's
duty to an injured third party. A comparison can therefore be
made to a closely related situation within the general area of construction-site negligence law: the potential liability of the employer of an independent contractor to the employees of the latter
resulting from the employer's personal negligence. 5 ' In Miller the
employer would be the owner who hires both the contractor and
the architect. The basis of this liability is clearly set out as
follows:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor but
who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject
to liability for physical harm to others whose safety the
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is
caused
by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable
54
care.
A comment to this section, however, presents a significant qualification:
In order for the rule stated to apply, the employer must
have retained at least some degree of control over the
50. The generally accepted rule is stated as follows:
An agent who, by promise or otherwise, undertakes to act for his
principal under such circumstances that some action is necessary
for the protection of the person or tangible things of another, is
subject to liability to the other for physical harm to him or to his
things caused by the reliance of the principal or of the other upon
his undertaking and his subsequent unexcused failure to act, if
such failure creates an unreasonable risk of harm to him and
the agent should so realize.
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

AGENcY

§ 354

(1957);

W. SEAVY,

AGENCY

§ 133 (1964) (citing general rule and noting exception in New York courts).
51. See Olsen v. Chase Manhatten Bank, 10 App. Div. 2d 539, 205
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 829, 175 N.E.2d 350, 215 N.Y.S.2d 773
(1961).
52. The Architect may owe a duty to the owner to visit and inspect the work hourly, daily, or weekly; but he owes no duty to
the employees of the Contractor to remain on the ground any
given length of time or to inspect the work at given intervals to
see that the plans and specifications, which fully and definitely
prescribe materials and dimensions and quantities, are followed by
the contractor, who is presumed to be competent....
130 App. Div. at 635, 115 N.Y.S. at 428.
53. It is important to distinguish the personal negligence of the
employer from his vicarious liability for the torts of the independent
contractor.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 414 (1965).
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manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that
he has merely a general right to order the work stopped
or resumed, to inspect or receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be
followed, or to prescribe alterationsor deviations. Such a
general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does

not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods
of work, or as to operative detail. 55
The case law makes a distinction in the degree of control necessary to result in a duty on the owner to protect the workers from
the contractor's methods. In one of the leading cases, McDonald v.
Shell Oil Co.,56 an employee of a contractor, who was engaged in
closing an oil well, was injured as a result of his employer's improper procedures. The owner of the well, and employer of the
contractor, had reserved the right to keep a supervising foreman on
the site. At the time of the injury, however, the foreman was absent. The decision exculpating the owner stated:
The general supervisory right to control the work so as
to insure its satisfactory completion in accordance with
the terms of the contract does not make the hirer of the
independent contractor liable for the latter's
negligent acts
7
in performing the details of the work.
It is suggested that these principles should be applied to
Miller. Whether the supervising architect is considered an independent contractor or the owner's agent, he is exercising control
for the owner pursuant to his contract.58 In other words, the
owner has delegated his power of control over the work to the
architect. The degree of control in Miller appears to be similar to
that found in cases like McDonald where the owner had no duty
of responsibility over the methods used by his contractor. An
architect should not be liable for failure to supervise the contractor's
methods where, under the same circumstances, the contractor's
employer would not be.
UNDERLYING RATIONALE OF MILLER

It is submitted that the underlying motive of the Illinois Supreme Court in Miller was to circumvent the limited recovery
55.

Id. comment c at 388 (emphasis added).

56. 44 Cal. 2d 785, 285 P.2d 902 (1955); accord, DeVille v. Shell Oil Co.,
366 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1966); Caldwell v. State, 39 Misc. 2d 898, 242 N.Y.S.2d
316 (Ct. Cl. 1963), aff'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 834, 253 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1964);
Celender v. Allegheny County Sanitary Authority, 208 Pa. Super. 390, 222
A.2d 461 (1966); cf. Dismore v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 F.2d 568 (7th
Cir. 1964).
57. 44 Cal. 2d at 788, 285 P.2d at 904.
58. According to the architects' contract with the owner in Miller,
"The Architect will endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and
deficiencies ... ." 37 Ill. 2d at 280, 226 N.E.2d at 635 (emphasis added).

In addition, the contractor's contract, in describing the architects' status
said, "He is the agent of the Owner...."

Id. at 282, 226 N.E.2d at 637.
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available to the severely injured plaintiffs from their employercontractor under workmen's compensation statutes. In fact, the
court openly suggested not only that liability should properly fall
on the contractor's shoulders, but also set out the means by which
the architects could shift their liability over to the contractor.
The appellate court dismissed the architects' third party complaint against the contractor stating:
The common law negligence courts were based on the
defendant architects allegedly actively failing to provide
for adequate support of the roof, failing to calculate a sufficient safety factor to be used in the scaffolding, failing to
oversee and inspect the scaffolding to determine whether
or not it was safe to use, and otherwise failing to apply
the degree of skill customarily brought to such work by
competent architects in and about the community; if they
were liable at all it would be only as active tort feasors
and the law precludes indemnification between active tort
feasors.' 9
The supreme court, however, reversed the dismissal on the
basis that: (1) the workmen's compensation law did not abrogate
an indemnity action brought against the contractor-employer; and
(2) the architects could be viewed as passive rather than active
tort feasors. Regarding the statute, they said that although the
language appears to limit an employer's liability to compensation
allowed under it, 60 the better reasoning permits a third party who
is only guilty of passive negligence to indemnify himself against
the actively negligent employer.6 1 Despite substantial author59. Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38 at 143, 208 N.E.2d 249 at 299
(1965) (emphasis added). Illinois does not allow contribution between joint
tort feasors, but it does permit indemnification of a passive tort feasor
from an active one.

See Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v. Evans

Construction Co., 32 Ill. 2d 600, 208 N.E.2d 573 (1965); John Griffiths & Sbn
Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1923).
60. See the following provisions in the ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, (1963):
§ 138.5 No common law or statutory right to recover damages
from the employer or his employees for injury or death sustained
by an employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such
employee, other than the compensation herein provided, shall be
available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of the
Act, to anyone wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal
representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury. (emphasis added).
§ 138.11 The compensation herein provided, . . . shall be the
measure of the responsibility of any employer....
61. The court recognized, however, that this is an area of law which
remains substantially unsettled. There appear to be three basic fact settings
in which the problem of exclusive remedy under workmen's compensation
law arises. The first is where the third party defendant seeks contribution
from the employer whose negligence has contributed to the employee's
injuries. This remedy is of course denied in jurisdictions, like Illinois,
where there is neither common law nor statutory provision for contribution. The second situation is where there is some contractual relationship
between the third party defendant and the employer. In this case the
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ity to the contrary, the court elected to follow several Illinois
which had previously recognized this
Appellate Court decisions
62
right of indemnification.
More significant, however, was the court's disagreement with
the appellate court on the degree of negligence attributable to the
architects. The court noted that the jury's finding of negligence
on the part of the architects could properly have been based only
on the alleged failure to stop the work or to prevent the contractor's negligence. The court's position is clearly stated:
If the jury could properly find that an injury was directly
caused by improper construction methods and techniques
used by a contractor, and, as we hold, that the architect
was liable only by reason of a failure to stop the work on
the job, we think that the jury could find that the contort feasor while the architects fault
tractor was an active
63
was merely passive.
The supreme court reversed the dismissal of the architects' third
party complaint and remanded it for retrial.6 4 In this manner the
court allowed a recovery greater than that permitted under workmen's compensation laws by first finding the architects liable of
courts will allow the third party defendant to indemnify himself, assuming
the employer was a cause of the plaintiff's injury, by saying that the indemnification is not based on the injury, but on the contractual relationship between the third party and the employer. This reasoning allows
circumvention of the exclusive remedy clause. Here again this reasoning
cannot be applied to Miller as there was no contractual relationship between the architect and the contractor. (The contractual relationship referred to is a general one rather than a specific contract to indemnify).
The third situation is where the third party defendant seeks indemnification from the employer where there is no contractual relation between
them; the exact circumstances which existed, in Miller.
It is well established that an active or primary tort feasor may be
required to indemnify a secondary or passive tort feasor. W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 48 at 280 (3d ed. 1964). The more difficult question
is whether the exclusive remedy clause in the workmen's compensation
statute prevents a recovery in this latter situation. In this case any liability for indemnification must be based exclusively on the injury to the
plaintiff-employee which is the exact object to which the workmen's compensation applies. The courts have generally held that in this situation
the exclusive remedy clause bars any right to indemnification from the
employer. See, e.g., Kennedy-Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner, 16 Wis. 2d 145, 113
N.W.2d 562 (1962); Abilene v. Jones, 355 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
For an in depth treatment of this entire area see 2 LARSON'S WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW § 78 et. seq. (Supp. 1967).
It appears that the court was straining in order to achieve a shifting of
the burden from the architects to the contractor.
62. Krambeer v. Canning, 36 Ill. App. 2d 428, 184 N.E.2d 747 (1962);
Boston v. Old Orchard Business District, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 324, 168
N.E.2d 52 (1960); Moroni v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 Il. App. 2d 534,
165 N.E.2d 346 (1960).
63. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273 at 291, 226 N.E.2d 630 at 641 (1967).
64. As of April 1, 1968 there is no decision on the remand of the
architect's third party complaint.
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technical or passive negligence, and then shifting liability to the
employer when the language of the workmen's compensation statute and the weight of authority would seem to preclude indemnity. Had the court found that the architects were free from
any negligence the plaintiffs would have received only workmen's
compensation.
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that in its effort to find a source of recovery
which would adequately compensate the plaintiffs, the court ignored the factual and economic realities of the situation and in
addition strained legal theory. The court minimized the fact
that the respective contracts of the architects and the contractor
with the owner gave the architects general supervision, and specifically designated the contractor as the party responsible for
constant and detailed supervision of the construction, including
installation of shoring for the protection of employees.
The majority of cases cited appear to give cognizance, at least
by inference, to a trade usage in the usual building situation
whereby the contractor has control over his own methods. The
Miller decision therefore creates an anomaly in the relationship of
those engaged in the construction industry. The industry is
based on a system of competitive bidding whereby the value of
each contractor's bid is dependent on his own methods, materials,
and personnel. Consequently, while each contractor has his own
construction policies, the result expected by the prospective owner
is not altered by his choice of contractor. To impose upon the architect the duty to supervise the contractor's methods and procedures
creates a potential atmosphere of conflict and misunderstanding
leading to even greater hazards to the construction worker.
Finally, the court only found the architects passively negligent
in order to implement its theory of indemnification against an actively responsible employer, despite the exclusive remedy provisions of the workmen's compensation laws and the weight of authority negating such indemnification.
That responsibility for negligently caused injuries should not
be cut off by such an artificial distinction as privity of contract is
recognized and accepted. On the other hand, legal responsibility
must evolve out of factual reality, not compassion for the injured,
nor a desire to circumvent the limited recovery allowed under
workmen's compensation laws. It is suggested that courts should
take cognizance of accepted divisions of responsibility within
the construction industry. The Miller decision has made the architect into a second contractor, a result not consistent with reality.
WILLIS A. SIEGFRIED, JR.

